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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Power Without Responsibility or Responsibility
Without Power?
Recent Developments in the Jurisdiction of the
Ontario Securities Commission
Mary G. Condon*

1. INTRODUCTION
In its present legislative form and in its administration, the Ontario Securities
Act has taken onto itself powers which this Commission believes were never
intended ... To correct this it believes that legislation should be enacted w hich
will clearly define and limit the powers of the administrative authority to requi
rements under such legislation, and that these should not be deviated from for
any reason of policy or otherwise.

These sentiments could plausibly have been expressed by some of
those making submissions to the 1994 Ontario Task Force on Securities
Regulation, or indeed by the plaintiffs in the Ainsley case, which pre
ceded the Task Force deliberations. Yet they are of considerably earlier
origin, being extracted from the Ontario Royal Commission on Mining,'
released in 1944, the acknowledged inspiration for the first comprehen
sive piece of securities legislation in this province,2 passed in 1945.
Thus, the first point to be made about the current controversy surround
ing the legality of the Ontario Securities Commission's (OSC) powers
is that it is by no means a new phenomenon, but has accompanied the
agency from its inception. It is likewise ironic that the issue which
sparked a political rethinking of the OSC's jurisdiction in 1944 was
virtually the same one that prompted recent judicial and political ex
amination of this issue, that of the regulation of professionals in the
retail, speculative segment of the securities market. Even in an era of
globalization, transnationals and international competitiveness, some
regulatory issues are constant.
With this historical context in mind, this commentary will outline
the trajectory of the current jurisdictional debate surrounding the OSC.
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
' Ontario. Report of the Royal Ontario Mining Commission. 1944 (Urquhart Com
mission) at 18-19.
2
Securities Act 1945, c. 22.
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The first public instalment was, as has been mentioned, the decision by
Mr. Justice Blair of the Ontario General Division in Ainsley.3 The uproar
which followed the decision prompted the provincial government to
establish a Task Force4 to examine a number of issues connected with
the legislative framework for the activities of the OSC, "with particular
attention to the policy-making role" of the agency. The Task Force
circulated an Interim Report for public comment in February 1994, and
aided by that response, issued its Final Report some four months later.5
Nor has publication of the Final Report precluded further political and
judicial developments. The Ainsley case has been appealed, and other
cases have been launched on related issues.6 However, the emphasis
here is on Mr. Justice Blair's decision in Ainsley and the report of the
Task Force that it generated.
2.

AINSLEY FINANCIAL CORPORATION V. ONTARIO
SECURITIES COMMISSION

The litigation in Ainsley was prompted by the OSC's publication
of its Policy 1.10,7 concerning the marketing and sale of "penny stocks",
which are essentially low-value stock of junior issuers in the over-thecounter market." The policy purported to provide guidance to dealers in
'

Ainsley Financial Corporation et al. v. OSC et al. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 280 (Gen.
Div).
Hie members of the Task Force were: Ronald Daniels (Chair), Associate Professor,
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto; Elizabeth Atcheson, Director, Policy Branch,
Financial Institutions, Ministry of Finance; Shane Kelford, Partner, Howard and
Ryan; Leslie Milrod, Director, Office of the General Counsel, Ontario Securities
Commission.
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penny stocks concerning the adoption of "appropriate business prac
tices" in their interactions with potential investors. The genesis of the
policy lay in the OSC's concerns about the lack of awareness on the part
of investors about the risks involved in purchasing these shares, as a
result of the sales practices employed. Losses sustained by investors for
these reasons were having "a significant adverse effect on the fairness
and integrity of the capital markets in Ontario''.
In furtherance of the objective of promoting better business prac
tices by these dealers, the policy required that (i) dealers make an as
sessment of the suitability of an investment for the client, (ii) clients be
furnished with documents comprising a "risk disclosure statement'"'
and a "suitability statement'' to give them an understanding of the risks
they were incurring in investing in these instruments, (iii) the compen
sation payable to securities dealers be disclosed, (iv) where applicable,
disclosure be made of the fact that a securities dealer is acting as principal
in a transaction, (v) trading practices employed by self-regulatory or
ganizations (SROs) be adopted, (vi) sales-oriented literature should con
form to standards established in the policy. It is crucial to understand
that the policy was addressed to only one category of registrant, i.e., socalled "securities dealers".10 It was issued pursuant to section 27 of the
statute which vests in the OSC the power to "suspend, cancel, restrict
or impose terms and conditions upon the registration or reprimand the
registrant where in its opinion such action is in the public interest'', after
giving the registrant an opportunity to be heard. In putting forward the
carrying the right to purchase such a security, including a partnership unit, a common
share, a preferred share and a warrant or right to purchase such a security . However
the definition does not include a security:
(1) listed and posted for trading on; the TSE, the ME, or the ASE and VSE (subject
to certain requirements in the latter two cases), provided the trade is executed in

Ontario Task Force on Securities Regulation. Responsibility and Responsiveness:
Final Report (Queen's Printer, June 1994).
F A. Manning v. OSC et al. (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 97 (Gen. Div.); R. v. Haldenby,
I I994| O.J. No. 1865 (Gen. Div.); Pezim v. B.C. (Superintendent of Brokers),[1994]
S.( J. No. 58. Since this commentary was completed in October 1994, an appeal
judgment, upholding Blair J.'sdecision, was rendered by the Ontario Court of Appeal
on December 21,1994 (Ainsley Financial Corporation v. Ontario Securities Com
mission (1995). 21 O.R. (3d) 104 (C.A.)). The Securities Amendment Act 1994,
w hich established a set of purposes and principles for securities legislation, gave the
OSC rule-making power and clarified the nature and operation of the policy-making
power, was proclaimed on January 1, 1995. However, certain policies, orders and
rulings become deemed rules only on March 1, 1995. Detailed consideration of these
developments is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this commentary.
Die first draft of this policy was published by the OSC on August 11,1992, and the
final draft on March 26, 1993.
More specifically, a "penny stock" was defined in the policy as follows: "... a
penny stock is an equity security of an issuer and a security convertible into or
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accordance with the regulations of such exchange;
(2) the issuer of which had assets or revenues above a certain amount;
(3) in respect of which trades are exempt from registration under s. 35(2) of the Act.
(4) that has a price of $5 or more, excluding commissions to the securities dealer.

9

(5) that is issued by a mutual fund;
(6) that the OSC may designate from time to time.
See Form 1 of Policy 1.10, (1993), 16 Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin
(O.S.C.B.) 1479. A precedent for such a statement, though cast in somewhat less
detailed terms, is provided by Article 20 and Appendix E of OSC Policy 5.2, Con

10

solidated Ontario Securities Act (Toronto: Carswell) 890 at 919, 930.
This is a residual category of registrant provided for in s. 98 of R.R.O. 1990, Reg
ulation 1015, Consolidated Ontario Securities Act, Carswell, 124, and defined as
follows: "a person or company that is registered for trading in securities and engages
in the business of trading in securities in the capacity of agent or principal .
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policy, the Commission also invoked "its general public interest juris
diction to protect investors and promote and maintain fair, equitable and
efficient capital markets in Ontario".11
The OSC's rationale for making the policy applicable only to the
securities dealer category of registrant was that other registrants who
were members of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) or Investment
IX-alers Association (IDA) were already subject to the more fine-grained
compliance and disciplinary rules of those organizations. While the Act
and the regulations require registrants to "deal fairly, honestly and in
good faith"12 with their clients, the Commission was concerned that
securities dealers ' 'were not complying with these obligations".13 More
over. while there were at the time of the decision approximately 64
securities dealers registered in the province, only the plaintiffs in Ainsley
"were engaged predominantly in the business of dealing in the trading
of penny stocks" and therefore it was they who were "primarily af
fected" by the introduction of the policy. The plaintiffs argued that the
effect of the policy on them would either be to drive them out of business
or into the arms of one of the SROs, and therefore presumably subject
them to SRO rules. In making this point, the plaintiffs were obviously
aware that there is, in Ontario securities policy, a historical preference
for the regulation of securities market participants to be accomplished
with the assistance of strong self-regulatory organizations.
Ilie main ground of argument relied upon by the plaintiffs to sup
port their contention that Policy 1.10 was invalid was that the OSC
lacked the jurisdiction to issue the policy. While Mr. Justice Blair ac
cepted the evidence adduced by the OSC concerning' 'abusive and unfair
sales practices in the marketing of penny stocks, obtained as a result
of a comprehensive review" of the industry,14 he agreed with the
plaintiffs argument that the Commission was acting outside the scope
of its statutory mandate when it issued Policy 1.10. The judge addressed
in turn the two legal bases on which the OSC had sought to erect its
policy. (1) a general public interest jurisdiction or (2) the discretion
pros ided to the OSC in connection with the registration power in section
27 of the Act.

POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY

(a) Public Interest Jurisdiction
An analysis of the provisions of the Securities Act and its regula
tions turned up no "general jurisdiction to regulate the securities indus
try in the public interest ,15 only a series of discrete powers to act in the
public interest with respect to, for example, exemptions from the positive
regulatory requirements of the Act or orders that trading in a specific
security cease.16 None of these provisions would support a general
policy-making power.
The OSC argued that the authority of the Supreme Court decision
in Capital Cities Communications,17 which upheld the validity of a
CRTC policy statement absent an explicit policy-making power in the
Broadcasting Act, should be determinative of the issue in the present
case.18 However, Mr. Justice Blair distinguished Capital Cities on three
grounds: (i) the Securities Act contained no broad mandating section
such as that contained in the Broadcasting Act which gave the CRTC
power to "regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broad
casting system" (ii) the policy in question in Ainsley was not a guideline
but a "mandatory requirement of a regulatory nature" (iii) the CRTC
policy statement had been promulgated after "extensive hearings in
volving the interested parties", in contrast to the situation at bar.
Of these three distinguishing criteria, Mr. Justice Blair singled out
the mandatory nature of the policy for more elaborate consideration. He
reiterated that a close reading of the text of Policy 1.10, as well as
evidence concerning "the approach of the Commission staff towards its
implementation", made clear that the OSC viewed the policy not as a
"mere guideline", to indicate how it might exercise its discretion, but
rather as "mandatory and regulatory in nature". In other words, the
OSC was usurping the regulation-making power granted in the statute
to the Lieutenant Governor in Council by creating a series of new
"appropriate practices" to be followed by securities dealers. Not only
did the policy elucidate when section 27, the discipline section, would
be triggered but it also had the effect of providing specific new grounds
for mobilizing section 27, if the terms of the policy were not complied
15

"

Policy 1.10 at 2.

"

See R.R.O. 1990, s . 197(1).
Policy 1.10 at 2.
Ainsley at _91 -292. This evidence was later described by the Task Force (at 37) as
a very extensive and thoughtful record".
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Ainsley at 292.

;; 0&4 ss. 74,104(2)(c) and 127.
Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609.
The OSC had relied on the authority of Capital Cities in its own decision in American
Diversified Realty (1991), 14 O.S.C.B. 551 at 592-593, where a similar challenge
was made to its jurisdiction to issue policy statements.
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with. This theme of the distinction between flexible policy and manda
tory regulation is likewise at the core of the recommendations of the
Task Force in its Interim and Final Reports.
The analysis by Mr. Justice Blair leaves open the question of what
the court's response would have been had the document not been framed
in such preemptory language.19 Had Policy 1.10 been framed as provid
ing only "guidelines" to good practice for dealers, it is likely that the
OSC would still have used adherence to the requirements outlined in the
policy as reasons to refuse or grant registration in individual cases, given
the "ampl[e] justification]" for its assessment of the need for such
discipline to be imposed on penny stock dealers. This might have solved
the jurisdictional problem, while leaving the regulatory objective intact.
In other words, the effect of the Ainsley decision is to focus on the
importance of the form for achieving regulatory goals (mandatory reg
ulation as opposed to flexible policy) at the expense of debate about the
substance of those goals.20
However, the position taken by Mr. Justice Blair seems to have
been that even this strategy would not necessarily have been successful.
In his judgment, "[e]ven if the Policy is not mandatory in its nature...
but simply issued "as a guide'' which is ' 'intended to inform interested
parties that the Commission will be guided by [it] in exercising its public
interest jurisdiction under subsection 27(1) of the Act", it still consti
tutes regulation, or is tantamount thereto, in my view".21 Leaving aside
the issue of how to define instruments that are "tantamount to regula
tion", this proposition seems to leave very little room at all for the
existence of policy statements as a legitimate tool of regulation. The
articulation by Mr. Justice Blair here of a circumscribed role for the
OSC seems to hark back to an earlier era in the history of judicial attitudes
to Regulatory agencies, when their activities were viewed with consid
erable suspicion.

;i

See the comment by the Task Force (at 16) that "(B)ased on our reading of the
Supreme Court decision in Capital Cities .. ., we believe that the absence of specific
statutory authorization for policy statements is not fatal to the legitimate use [my
emphasis] of this instrument by the Commission".
I am not necessarily arguing here that such a debate was one that should have been
entered into by Mr. Justice Blair, since that would be subject to the principles of
judicial review, but only that jurisdictional issues can be used to forestall substantive
debate about the adequacy of regulatory goals and strategies for achieving those
goals. This point is elaborated below.
Ainsley at 297.
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(b) Section 27 Powers
Having disposed of the Commission's assertion of a general juris
diction to make policy in the public interest, Mr. Justice Blair addressed
the more specific plank of the agency's putative basis for Policy 1.10.
The key to his decision on this ground of argument lay in his interpre
tation of the language of section 27 as providing only for individualized
decisions, pursuant to a hearing concerning specific registrants.22 Thus
the public interest jurisdiction afforded by section 27 extended only to
considerations made on a case-by-case basis, with no ' 'authority to make
prospective proclamations of general application for all affected regis
trants". Once more, the potential role of policy-making in providing
useful guidelines to indicate how the case-by-case discretion would be
exercised is again accorded little priority. This is undoubtedly a conser
vative approach to the role and importance of policy-making in regula
tory activity.
An irony of the distinction relied on by Mr. Justice Blair between
the regulatory powers accorded to the Lieutenant Governor in Council,
under the Securities Act, and the case-by-case decision-making powers
given to the Commission,23 is the existence of section 105 of the Regu
lations.24 This provides that:
The Commission may prescribe conditions of registration for a registrant or group
of registrants that are in lieu of some or all of the conditions of registration
prescribed..., whereit gives prior notice of the proposed conditions to registrants
affected and affords the registrant an opportunity to be heard and the Commission
publishes notice in a publication published by the Commission of each instance
when it so prescribes.

In other words, in section 105 the OSC was delegated the power to make
regulations with respect to conditions of registration, including the han
dling of new accounts and supervision of account procedures, both issues
which are dealt with in Policy 1.10. This delegation of regulation-making
22

Mr. Justice Blair pointed out (at 296-297) that contrary to the terms of s. 27. no
hearing was held prior to the introduction of Policy 1.10. He went on to note thai
"one of the complaints of the plaintiffs" was that "they were not consulted in any
meaningful way", whereas others (i.e., their competitors) were consulted, and as a
result of that consultation, were exempted from the dictates of the policy. However,
when draft Policy 1.10 was released, Ainsley Financial Corporation, as well as the
Securities Dealers Association, the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Investment
Dealers Association, all provided a response to the Commission. The plaintiffs were
presumably referring to some earlier opportunity provided to the TSE and the IDA
10 8've input concerning the terms of the policy.

23

See above at pp. 227-228.

R.R.O.1990, Regulation 1015, at 125.
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power was subjected to certain procedural requirements, in particular,
that of prior notice to registrants. Presumably however, had the OSC
exercised its powers under section 105, the provisions would have had
to conform both to the parliamentary rules concerning their approval
and the obligation to afford registrants the "opportunity to be heard".
Mr. Justice Blair did not deal extensively with the implications of the
existence of section 105 for the arguments made in the case, but con
tented himself with remarking that the OSC "has apparently chosen not
to follow this route in paving the way for the introduction of the pol
icy"."

-;
>•
C
t
ft

r
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In conclusion, underlying the Ainsley decision is a circumscribed
view of the utility of policy-making by administrative agencies and of
the appropriate kind of regulatory decision-making. It is a view that
underrates the significance of the expertise developed by an agency in
dealing with regulatory problems over time, and in fact seems to actively
discourage them from making use of that expertise. The seriousness of
the issues raised by the case, of course, lie in the fact that the absence
of a jurisdiction on which to base a policy-making power has implications for Securities Commission policy far outside the securities dealer
or registration area. It was this general concern about the uncertain status
of OSC policy statements which prompted the provincial government
to establish the Task Force on Securities Regulation, to whose deliberations we now turn.

«

r
;i
-
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" Mr. Justice Blair's comments here also demonstrate the confusion that can be gen
erated from what appear to be overlapping regulatory powers granted to two bodies.
The Lieutenant Governor has been granted powers to regulate in areas concerning
the furnishing of information to the public by registrants, regulation of trading in the
OTC market, the prescribing of documents and forms to be filed under the Act, and
matters respecting the content and distribution of material distributed with respect
to securities. Mr. Justice Blair argued that because of this, the Lieutenant Governor
already "occupied the field" with respect to the matters covered in Policy 1.10,
therefore the OSC would not even have had jurisdiction to introduce them as regu
lations. This is despite the fact that s. 105 of the Regulations gives the Commission
power to prescribe conditions of registration in lieu of conditions already prescribed
in various sections, including s. 114, which refers to the requirement that "every
registered dealer ... shall establish procedures for dealing with its clients that con
form with prudent business practice and that enable it to service its clients adequately

229

3. ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION: FINAL REPORT
As mentioned above, the Task Force continued the theme identified
in Ainsley of the importance of the distinction in administrative law
doctrine between policies and regulations or rules, as they are designated
in American administrative law. The major recommendations26 of the
Task Force can therefore be considered under three heads: (i) a grant to
the OSC of a legally sanctioned power to make policy statements (ii)
the establishment of a rule-making power for the agency with various
procedural prerequisites (iii) the revision of the Securities Act to incor
porate a "purposes and principles" section such as exists in other juris
dictions, notably Quebec. Let us address each of these issues in turn.
(a) Policy-Making
The recommendations of the Task Force under this head began by
enumerating several advantages to be gained by the use of policy state
ments in the context of securities regulation. These include consistency
and predictability for constituents, comprehensiveness in the treatment
of issues, the opportunity for constituents to inform policy development,
the opportunity for flexibility of application on the basis of infringement
of policy objectives or public interest concerns (since they ' 'do not have
the force of law"), guidance as to the appropriateness of enforcement
action, national and international regulatory coordination. Yet, accord
ing to the Task Force, these advantages, in particular that of flexibility
of application on the basis of contextual judgments, have been dimin
ished by the agency's tendency to treat its policy statements as manda
tory and as "equivalent to legislation",27 without engaging in the "pro
cedures and substantive constraints appropriate f o r l a w - m a k i n g ' ' T h i s
means, in the case of legislation and regulations, "direct oversight by
representatives of the elected branch of government". The solution to
this regulatory overreaching favoured by the Task Force was to provide
explicit statutory authority for the agency to develop and implement
The Task Force received 34 submissions from individuals and organizations to its
first request for comments, and 27 in response to the publication of the Interim
Report. A summary of those responses is very usefully presented in Appendices IV
^ and Vn of the Final Report.
See the first round submission by Mr. James Baillie to the Task Force, quoted in the
Final Report at 14.
Final Report at 16.
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policies with an accompanying stipulation that such instruments would
be for guidance only and would not have the force of law.29

Definition of Policies: Since the Task Force went on to recommend a
power for the OSC to make mandatory rules, it was necessary to provide
some indication of the distinction between the respective roles of policies
and rules. The Report therefore provides a definition of a policy state
ment, to be included in a revised statute. It is a statement (a) of the
principles or factors influencing an exercise of discretionary authority
by the OSC, (b) outlining the interpretation or application by the OSC
of statutory provisions, regulations or rules,and (c) of regulatory practice
in the performance of statutory duties and responsibilities. This articu
lation of the role of policies allows us to see their importance in filling
the gap created by a political commitment to the value of experience
and expertise in regulating aspects of economic and social activity.
Policies are necessary to proactively structure individual exercises of
discretion based on interpretations of the public interest on the one hand,
and to elaborate and render more specific the general provisions of
statutes and regulations on the other. Interestingly, the Task Force rec
ognized that even the rules to be created by the OSC could not be
sufficiently precise to be determinative in all novel, borderline or un
foreseen circumstances. It is notable too that the Task Force was prepared
to countenance a broader and more proactive role for policies in the
regulation of securities markets than that expressed by Mr. Justice Blair
in Aitisley, when faced with the context at issue there.
Further insight into the Task Force's view of the contribution of
policies to the regulatory enterprise is provided in its recommendations
for a "full review" to be undertaken by the OSC of its existing policies,
to determine whether or not they are "proper policy statements" (i.e.
non-mandatory), whether they should be redrafted to become proper
policies, or be elevated to the status of rules.30 Policies should contain
"general statements of principle or practice, and should not include
mandatory and comprehensive codes of conduct". However, policies
can address "fairly specific issues".31 The former articulation of the
N

Final Report at 17.

10

For details of the proposed transitional arrangements for policies, which would have
significant resource implications for the OSC, see the Final Report at 40-43.
Elsewhere in the Report, it is argued that the content of policies is to be formulated
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appropriate content of policies seems to leave insufficient room for them
to fulfil the functions assigned to them by the Task Force. If a policy is
to be useful in structuring discretion concerning exercises of a "public
interest" mandate, or providing interpretations of broad statutory pro
visions, it is hard to see how it can itself be general or vague. It is
presumably possible for a policy to be specific while avoiding being
mandatory.
Notice and Comment Requirements: Finally, the expectation that
policy statements "will continue to play an enduring and important role
in the securities law regime" is evidenced by the contrast between the
Interim and Final Reports' position on a notice and comment process
for policy-making. The Interim Report had suggested that there was a
less urgent need for a formal notice and comment process for policies if
these statements, which would previously have been mandatory, would
now be recast as rules. The Task Force had even expressed a concern
that such "costly and cumbersome" procedural obligations on the
agency would act as a disincentive to the "expeditious articulation of
policy". However, as a result of the negative response it received to this
aspect of its recommendations, revolving around the need for "public
deliberation and debate" to provide safeguards against the abuse of
policy-making power, the Final Report recommended that a notice and
comment obligation for policies be adopted in a revised statute. This
process would nevertheless be "relaxed in certain material respects"
from the one recommended for rules.32 It is to be hoped that this relax
ation will ultimately be sufficient to avoid the problem of "regulatory
gridlock" which characterizes the policy-making of some American
regulatory agencies.
(b) Rule-Making
Given the arguments mobilized in the Report against "mandatory
policy statements, which were, in the main, that they do not ensure
"proper deliberation, debate, and accountability", the decision by the
Task Force to plump for a rule-making power for the OSC rather than
"pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Act", which are recommended to
32

be specified therein.
The relaxation here revolved around a shorter public comment period and an absence
of Cabinet involvement.

232

BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY

[10 B.F.L.R.]

revitalized regulation-making by Cabinet is interesting. The position
adopted here, in contrast to that taken with respect to policy statements,
is that the "intensity of the demand for Cabinet time" along with "the
technical nature of securities regulation" militates against enhanced
involvement by a democratically-elected body. On the contrary, the need
for a ' 'high degree of specialized expertise by persons familiar not only
with the framework and philosophy of securities regulation, but also
market practice" prompted the Task Force to recommend the conferral
of a rule-making power on the OSC, which rules would have the same
force and effect as Cabinet regulations. This recommendation had gar
nered "widespread public support", including from the OSC itself,
during the Task Force's deliberations.33

Revision of Section 143: The mechanism for achieving the grant of
rule-making power had generated some controversy in the responses to
the Interim Report where it was first outlined.34 The resolution proffered
by the Final Report was to redraft section 143(1) of the Securities Act
in a detailed fashion so as to enumerate all of the areas where the OSC
would be empowered to make rules, subject to an open-ended "basket
provision", providing for rule-making "respecting any other matter
authorized by or required to implement any provision of this Act". This
approach was asserted to enhance "market certainty" by providing
precise support for all existing subordinate instruments except for those
few policy statements or subject matters which ... are characterised as
controversial".

Exclusions from the Rule-Making Power: The singling out of several
policy statements as controversial warrants further attention. In these
areas, enumerated in Appendix 1, Part II of the Final Report, thedecision
is left to the legislature as to whether they should be subject to OSC

The possibility of according a rule-making power to the OSC was first alluded to by
Mr. Justice Blair in Ainsley, quoting approvingly from an article by Professor Jeffrey
Macintosh entitled The Excessive Use of Policy Statements by Canadian Securities
Regulators" (1992), 1 Corporate Financing 19 at 20.
The Interim Report had proposed that sufficient legal authorization for the rule
making power could be obtained from the proposed "purposes and principles"
statement in the statute. Some of the respondents to the Interim Report considered
this "insufficiently precise" to "prevent abuse by a future Commission". On the
other hand, the OSC itself considered that such a section would not provide enough
guidance for the resolution of potential conflicts between existing policies, to be
elevated to rules, and the legislation itself.
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powers. And what are these areas? They are (i) the power
to prescribe additional requirements in respect of market participants,
including requirements concerning disclosure of information by them
to the public, membership in an SRO, and requirements with respect to
take-over bids and related party transactions, (ii) the regulation of de
fensive tactics in response to take-over bids, (iii) the regulation of related
party transactions. It is with respect to these specific exclusions from
recommendations for a rule-making power for the OSC that we see the
close connection between debate about the jurisdictional adequacy of
OSC actions and debate about the appropriateness of the substantive
regulatory goals of the agency and its interpretation of the public interest.
The first of these controversial areas refers to matters that include the
impugned Policy 1.10 itself, while the third refers to OSC Policy 9.1,
which is singled out for specific attention several times in the course of
the Task Force's Final Report.35
The sources of the controversy about these particular exercises of
regulatory power are not well defined by the Task Force. It was initially
generated, apparently, by ' 'some in the Ontario capital markets", which
presumably includes a number of those individuals and organizations
making submissions to the Task Force itself. The grounds for the con
troversy have to do with "the appropriate relationship of securities and
corporate law",36 and specifically a concern that securities regulators
are intervening in matters more properly the realm of corporate law and
the courts. While this may be a valid issue for debate in connection with
Policy 9.1 and defensive tactics, it is hard to see how it applies to Policy
1.10, since the OSC has long had regulatory responsibility for the activ
ities of securities market participants. The Task Force may well be right
that the legitimacy of these aspects of OSC activity should be decided
upon by the legislature, in accordance with democratic principles. How-

35

See Final Report at v, 15, 32, 39. OSC Policy 9.1 creates an extensive set of
procedural requirements to be adhered to by issuers who wish to engage in ' "related
party" or "going private" transactions, or insider or issuer bids, all of which terms
are defined in the policy. The requirements imposed with respect to the transaction
or bid consist of three separate aspects, subject to the possibility of an exemption,
(i) disclosure of information, (ii) valuation, and (iii) majority of the minority ap
proval. A fourth procedure, the establishment of an independent committee of the
board to review the transaction or bid, is recommended.

36

Rnal Report at 1-63.
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ever, an important first step might be an acknowledgment that the emer
gence of calls for democratic re-evaluation in these areas may not be
unconnected to the unhappiness of specific regulatory constituencies
with substantive regulation imposed on them by an active administrative
agency. If this is the case, the question of the appropriateness of defi
nitions of the public interest expressed in policies such as 1.10 or 9.1
should be squarely and publicly addressed on its merits, rather than
being framed more narrowly as an issue of jurisdictional competence to
make policies.

Role of Cabinet: A key component of the rule-making provisions rec
ommended by the Task Force is the right of Cabinet disapproval or
amendment, within 60 days of adoption of the rule by the Commission.
Here the Task Force favoured arguments that such a process ensured
agency accountability over countervailing claims that it would under
mine the independence of the OSC from "partisan political influence".
The Report envisages that Cabinet would consider only those rules
"referred by the Minister" for its attention, and that the "disapproval
process would be invoked only sparingly". More frequent disapproval
risked provoking the disaffection of regulatory constituencies from ac
tive participation in OSC deliberations.37 Conversely, of course, the right
of Cabinet amendment of OSC rules may give regulatory constituents a
further avenue of influence over the ultimate content of OSC rules.
Notice and Comment Process: Legislative provision for an elaborated
notice and comment process was considered by the Task Force to be the
most effective safeguard against the regulatory hubris that might oth
erwise result from the grant of rule-making power. "Informed involve
ment by stakeholders" was seen as crucial to the maintenance of "ac
countability and transparency" in the rule-making process. The
mechanics of this process that were favoured by the Task Force are
outlined in the Report.38 A key initiative involved the responsibility to
Cabinet jurisdiction to make regulations was recommended to be co-extensive with
the OSC power to make rules, but it was expected that the initiative would be taken,
in the future as at present, by the agency itself.
Final Report at 36. These involve published requests for comments, a 90-day time
period to make submissions, a subsequent — though attenuated — notice and com
ment period if material amendments" are made to the rule, publication of the final
rule in the Bulletin and publication of the Cabinet response
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be assumed by the OSC in the notice and comment process,39 though
the Report stopped short of requiring mandatory public hearings.40

(c) Statutory Provision for Purposes and Principles
The final significant — and long overdue — legislative innovation
proposed by the Task Force is the enactment of a "purposes and prin
ciples" section in the statute. For some decades now, the dual purposes
of investor protection and maintaining fair and efficient markets have
been cited, by both the OSC and commentators, as the prevailing moti
vators of regulatory activity. This occurs in spite of there being no
definitive statutory recognition of their validity.41 The proposal of the
Task Force fills this void. Accordingly, it recommends that the purposes
to be legislatively enshrined are: (a) to provide protection to investors
from unfair, improper, or fraudulent practices and (b) to foster fair and
efficient capital markets and confidence in such markets so as to enhance
and facilitate capital formation. For the Task Force, the renewed impor
tance of an explicit statement of purposes lies partly in its role in inform
ing any further policy-making by the OSC.42
Acknowledging the looseness of this statement of purposes, the
Task Force goes on to enunciate certain "fundamental principles" that
should be used "to direct and structure the OSC's interpretation of the
Act's purposes". Collectively, the effect of these principles is to artic
ulate the range of regulatory strategies necessary to achieve the stated
purposes, while acknowledging that, in any given context, these pur
poses may have to be' 'balanced'' against each other. Thus the principles
indicate that the primary regulatory strategies are the "timely, accurate
and efficient disclosure of information", the prevention of fraud, and
the assessment of the "fitness" of market participants, along with
"timely, open and efficient" enforcement of the Act's provisions. The
historical commitment in the Ontario scheme of securities regulation to
the role of SROs is also explicitly reinforced, as are the needs to coor39

40

41

42

See the discussion of the need for an OSC "supporting statement at 37 and a
"summary of comments" at 38.
The Report at 40 also proposed the possibility of a waiver of the notice and comment
process in "matters of urgency".
Of course, both commentators and decision-makers give differing weights at differ
ent times to these diverse objectives.
Final Report at 17.
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dinate provincially-based securities regimes and to pay attention to
"business and regulatory costs" in the realization of regulatory objec
tives. The declaration of these principles will not, of course, determine
very many specific regulatory outcomes, but their importance lies in the
signal they send concerning the authority and trust reposed in the agency
to decide, from a range of alternatives and instruments, how best to
achieve the Act's purposes.

4.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
' 'The interesting issue is not how well bureaucracies are controlled, but rather the
balance between expertise and accountability in different policy areas and the
limits or constraints on each."43

Clearly, the policy-making powers of the OSC have needed for
some time to be put on a firmer legal footing. Equally clearly, the result
of a grant of rule-making power to the OSC would be to expand signif
icantly its powers to regulate issuers and members of SROs, subject to
the safeguards of Cabinet disapproval and the notice and comment proc
ess. The interesting lessons of Ainsley and the Task Force Final Report
revolve around their respective visions of the regulatory enterprise and
the scope to be given to the agency to satisfy regulatory objectives. In
the view of this observer, the Task Force strikes a more appropriate
"balance between expertise and accountability" in its recognition that
policies will continue to be necessary for effective and responsive reg
ulation of the securities industry, and that the OSC should have the
power to promulgate mandatory rules.
Yet there are several worrying features of the Task Force's ap
proach. An administrative lawyer might worry about the clarity of the
distinction between matters to be the subject of a policy instrument and
those to be the subject of rules. She might also worry about whether
sufficient guidance is provided to the OSC concerning the point at which
rule-making should be instituted, and about the risk that the imposition
of extensive procedural requirements will present serious resource dif
ficulties for an already stretched agency. More generally, the Final Re
port contains various references to the important role of the "public"
and the responsible citizen'' in providing input to the regulatory proc
ess. As a recommendation for the future this is indeed a laudable pro-
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posal, in that it may assist in democratizing this arena of economic life.
As a description of what happens at present however, it is somewhat
disingenuous to suggest that those without an ongoing, direct and pro
fessional interest in influencing regulatory outcomes currently play any
significant role in making policy submissions to the agency or com
menting on draft documents. Thus when the Task Force refers44 to a lack
of "public appreciation" for the rationale of Policy 1.10, it may be
blurring the distinction between those with an immediate and direct
stake in the content of the policy and those without such an interest.
The point being made here is that there is a need to acknowledge
the role of interested constituencies in framing regulatory agendas and
influencing the course and content of regulatory debate. One interpre
tation of the genesis of the current concern about the OSC's jurisdiction
is that the plaintiffs in Ainsley were using the jurisdictional argument
about lack of policy-making authority as a stalling strategy to prevent
the application of an onerous policy to their professional endeavours.
This turned out to be successful despite the fact that there was evidence
of considerable regulatory justification for the policy. Neither can it be
doubted that there were other strategies available to the OSC to achieve
its objectives. The same result could well have been accomplished by
means of the powers granted in section 105 of the Regulations, or more
dramatically, by recommending to the legislature that it force the crea
tion of an SRO for that segment of the industry. There is historical
precedent for such a strategy. In the 1940s, the then Chair of the OSC,
McTague, claimed a central role in the passage of the Act to provide for
the establishment of the Broker Dealers Association,45 a self-regulatory
organization for the predecessors of the penny stock dealers.46
To reiterate, by focusing on the OSC's competence to use various
regulatory instruments, we risk losing sight of the fact that the debate
may, in essence, be about substantive interpretations of the public inter
est, and who is to have the power to make those interpretations. Juris
dictional confrontations may be, in some cases, only one move in a
bigger game of the politics of regulation, which is about the ongoing
44
45
44

Khademian, A., The SEC and Capital Market Regulation (University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1992) at 210.
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Final Report at 37.
S.0.1947, c. 8.
For further details, see Condon, M.G., Ideas and Regulatory Practice: The Ontario
Securities Commission, 1945-1978, S.J.D. Thesis, Faculty of Law, Universily of
Toronto, 1991.
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efforts of regulatory constituents to have their interests met in the ad
ministrative process and their particular interpretations of concepts such

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

as the "public interest" validated by the agency.

The "Good Banking Code of Practice"
of the United Kingdom

At the moment, the OSC has been accorded the status of expert
decision-maker and policy-maker in the securities arena. In this position,
it is expected to respond to emerging problems with a view to achieving
legislative objectives. There is precedent for the agency to develop
policy which is not contemplated in the legislative framework. In 1968,
the OSC introduced, by means of policy statement, a scheme for requir
ing the "timely disclosure" of "material and significant information"
hy issuers regulated under the Securities Act. This concept of timely
disclosure is now a staple of the legislative framework. My point here
is not that there is no need for adequate legal authority for administrative
action, but rather that it is in the nature of regulatory innovation to
sometimes outstrip legislative oversight. Before legitimate regulatory
objectives are conclusively derailed by the strategic mobilization of
jurisdictional devices, we need to give due weight to the expertise side
ot the expertise/accountability balance, and we should be clear-sighted
about the sources from which challenges to substantive regulatory ob
jectives come.

Dennis Rosenthal*
1. INTRODUCTION
In January 1987 the Government, together with the Bank of Eng
land, commissioned the Review Committee under the Chairmanship of
Professor Robert Jack to conduct an assessment of the existing legislative
framework for banking services. The Committee's finding was that
whilst the legislative framework had stood the test of time there were a
number of areas where banking practice could be improved. The recom
mendations included that banks should promulgate a Code of Banking
Practice on standards of best practice and that, if considered necessary,
the Government should in due course enact enabling legislation to sup
port a statutory Code of Banking Practice.1
The Government fully endorsed the Committee's recommendation
for a non-statutory statement of best practice covering all the areas
referred to in the Review Committee's Report.2 The Government spec
ified, in particular, that customers should be given information in clear
and simple language about the terms of their contract with their banker
and the rights and obligations that are to apply on both sides; should be
told of their right to privacy which the law already affords and the very
limited circumstances in which any information about their personal
finances may be passed on; how to lodge a complaint if it proves nec
essary; how such complaints should be dealt with and how matters may
be referred to the relevant ombudsman; what banking charges may be
levied and in what circumstances; and that they should be given a simple
explanation of the timing of the cheque clearing cycle and when they
might normally expect a cheque to be cleared.
*
1

1

Solicitor, Partner Banking and Finance Group Forsyte Saunders Kerman, London.
U.K. Banking Services: Law and Practice — Report by the Review Committee Cm.
622 (London HMSO 1989) (Chairman: Professor R.B. Jack), reviewed in (1989-90)
5 B.F.L.R. 397.
White Paper: Banking Services: Law and Practice, Cm. 1026, March 1990.

